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Abstract
This paper focuses on Byzantine attack detection for Gaussian two-hop one-way relay network, where an amplify-and-forward
relay may conduct Byzantine attacks by forwarding altered symbols to the destination. For facilitating attack detection, we utilize
the openness of wireless medium to make the destination observe some secured signals that are not attacked. Then, a detection
scheme is developed for the destination by using its secured observations to statistically check other observations from the relay.
On the other hand, notice the Gaussian channel is continuous, which allows the possible Byzantine attacks to be conducted
within continuous alphabet(s). The existing work on discrete channel is not applicable for investigating the performance of the
proposed scheme. The main contribution of this paper is to prove that if and only if the wireless relay network satisfies a non-
manipulable channel condition, the proposed detection scheme achieves asymptotic errorless performance against arbitrary attacks
that allow the stochastic distributions of altered symbols to vary arbitrarily and depend on each other. No pre-shared secret or
secret transmission is needed for the detection. Furthermore, we also prove that the relay network is non-manipulable as long as
all channel coefficients are non-zero, which is not essential restrict for many practical systems.
I. INTRODUCTION
Relay nodes are widely employed in modern communication networks to enhance coverage and connectivity of the networks.
This dependence on the relaying infrastructure may increase the risk on security as malicious relays may forward false
information in order to deceive the intended participants into accepting counterfeit information. These attacks, referred to as
Byzantine attacks, impose significant ramifications on the design of network protocols [1][2]. With the presence of Byzantine
attacks, the attack detection technique, which determines whether Byzantine attacks are conducted or not, is one of the key
steps supporting secure communication.
R. Cao is with the the School of Information and Communication Engineering, Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications (BUPT), Beijing
100876, China (e-mail: caoruohan@bupt.edu.cn).
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2The work on attack detection starts above physical-layer, where each link is treated as a unit-capacity bit-pipe, while specific
physical-layer characteristics are shielded. Based on this setting, cryptography keys are often used to make attacks detectable
[3], [4], while requiring the cryptographic keys, to which the relays are not privy, to be shared between the source and
destination before the communication takes place. Without using cryptography keys, information theoretic detection schemes
are proposed for multicast system or Caterpillar Network [5], [6]. These schemes are able to achieve errorless performance in
probability, yet assuming that at least one relay or link is absolutely trustworthy.
Besides these schemes treating channels as noiseless bit-pipes, there are also many other attack detection schemes designed
according to specific characteristics of physical-layer channels for varying application scenarios. These schemes are mainly
enabled by utilizing tracing symbols, or self-information provided by network topology structure. In tracing-based schemes [7]-
[10], source node inserts tracing symbols into a sequence of information bits, and then sends them together to the destination.
Relying on the priori knowledge of tracing symbols, the destination could detect attacks by comparing its observed tracing
symbols and the ground truth of tracing symbols. This tracing-based method is applicable with perfect CSI [7], [8] or no
need of CSI [9], [10] for varying network scenarios. The tracing-symbol based schemes commonly assume that the value
and insertion location of the tracing symbols are known only at the source and the destination, which indeed requires a
additional tracing-symbol distribution mechanism implemented between communication parties. Besides that, these schemes
assume that each malicious relay garbles its received symbols according to independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.)
stochastic distributions. This model of i.i.d. attacks may not always be valid in practice, although it makes analysis simple.
The Byzantine attack detection methods presented in [7]-[10] may no longer be provably unbreakable for non-i.i.d. attacks.
Notice that all the above-mentioned schemes detect attacks by inserting redundancy, the overhead cost thus increases.
In contrast, the schemes, utilizing side information (SI) provided by network topology structure, do not need to insert any
redundancy or just insert negligible redundancy [11]-[19]. The detectability of parts of these schemes are beyond i.i.d. attacks
[15]-[19]. Generally, upon the network topology structure, most of these schemes are able to gain secured SI, that it is absolutely
not attacked, and it is statistically correlated to the observations from the relay when the relay is non-malicious. Then, the SI
can be used to check the signals observed from the relay. For instance, in [11] and [12], a direct link between source and
destination allows the destination to observe signals from the source directly. These observations are secured SI according
to its safeness and statistic dependence on other observations. Then, attacks are detectable by comparing the observations
from the relay with the secured SI. Similarly, in [13] and [14], source node detects attacks using its transmitted signals as
secured SI. The detection performance of [11]-[14] are impacted by channel fading and signal-to-noise ratio (SNR). Some
denoising measures, such as perfect correction codes (ECCs), are often required. However, due to channel fading, the achieved
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the the quality of direct link, such that it may not work well in the network where direct link does not exist or suffers deep
fading.
On the contrary, [15]-[19] could detect attacks with arbitrary small error probability. In particular, [15]-[18] consider two-way
relaying (TWR) protocol for the typical three-node network, where communication parties could use its transmitted signals as
secured SI to detect arbitrary attacks. To elaborate a little further, in [15], communication parties are required to simultaneously
transmit signal to relay with the same power constraint, then each node’s own lattice-coded transmitted symbols are employed
to simultaneously support secret transmission and construct an algebraic manipulation detection (AMD) code to detect arbitrary
Byzantine attacks in TWR networks with Gaussian channels. It is difficult to extend this scheme to non-Gaussian channels
and to the destination with restricted power. In our previous work [16]-[18], focusing on two-way relay system, we show
that for discrete memoryless channels (DMCs), it is possible to detect arbitrary Byzantine attacks dispensing any AMD code
or cryptographic keys. The basic idea is that each node utilizes its own transmitted symbols as secured SI for statistically
checking against the other node’s symbols forwarded by the relay. This scheme is difficult to extend beyond DMC channels.
We extend the method proposed in [16]-[18] to the DMC one-way relay system composing of two potential malicious relays.
Since all observations of the destination are prone to be attacked [19], this network setup only provides unsecured SI for the
destination. This work indicates that due to the lack of secured SI, we cannot properly protect communication parties against
arbitrary attacks.
In this paper, we consider attack detection problem for the wireless typical three-node network. One-way relaying protocol
is performed in the network. The goal of this paper is to make the destination probabilistically detect arbitrary attacks, despite
of i.i.d or non-i.i.d attacks, without using any AMD code or secret transmission. To that end, we facilitate attack detection by
utilizing the openness of wireless medium to make the destination obtain secured SI, i.e., the signals directly heared from the
source, etc. On the other hand, due to properties of wireless medium again, all observed signals are continuous, the possible
attacks are also continuous in the sense that they are likely to be conducted within continuous alphabet(s). Our previous work
focusing on utilizing secured SI in DMCs [16]-[19] are not applicable to investigate the detectability of continuous attacks.
This paper proves the detectability of continuous attacks is equivalent to the non-manipulability of wireless channels, also
proves the non-manipulability of general wireless channels. The main contributions of this paper are summarized as follows:
1) We prove that under a non-manipulable condition of wireless channel, all Byzantine attacks, despite of i.i.d or non-i.i.d, are
asymptotically detectable by simply using secured SI to statistically check the observations from the relay. The proposed
scheme does not use any AMD code or secret transmission, while achieving asymptotically errorless performance. This
4result is summarized in Theorem 1 of Section III.
2) We prove that the non-manipulable channel condition is satisfied as long as the secured SI is not vacancy. It is not
essential restrict for the general wireless relay networks with direct channels. It further indicates the system does not
need much power burden to generate the secured SI. This result is summarized in Proposition 1 of Section III.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we discuss the system model and formalize the problem to be
addressed. We detail our main contribution as stated above in Section III. Numerical Examples are presented in Section IV.
The conclusions are drawn in Section V. In Appendices A, we detail the proof of Proposition 1. In Appendices B and C, we
detail the necessity and sufficiency proofs of Theorem 1, respectively.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A. Notation
Let A be an 2-dimensional M×N matrix. For i = 1, 2, . . . ,M and j = 1, 2, . . . , N , [A]i,j denotes the (i, j)th entry of A.
Let B be an 3-dimensional M×N×K matrix. For i = 1, 2, . . . ,M , j = 1, 2, . . . , N , and k = 1, 2, . . . ,K, [B]i,j,k denotes
the (i, j, k)th entry of B. Whenever there is no ambiguity, we will employ the notation with no brackets for simplicity. The
identity and zero matrices of any dimension are denoted by the generic symbols I and 0, respectively.
For continuous random variables, we use capital letters and lower-case letters to denote the random variables and variables of
corresponding probability density functions (PDFs), respectively. For instance, suppose U and V are random variables defined
over (−∞, +∞). fU (u) and fV (v) denote PDFs of U and V , respectively. fV |U (v |u ) denotes the conditional PDF of V
given U . FV |U (v |u ) denotes the conditional cumulative distribution function (CDF) of V given U . We employ Un to denote
a sequence of n continuous random variables defined over (−∞, +∞), and Ui to denote the ith random variable in Un.
fV n|Un (vn |un ) denotes the conditional PDF of V n given Un.
For the discrete random variables, we use upper-case script letters and serif-font letters to denote the corresponding
discrete alphabets and elements in the alphabets, respectively. For instance, suppose that we denote a finite alphabet by
X = {x1, x2, . . . , x|X |}, where |X | is the cardinality of X . Then X is a generic random yariable oyer X , and x is a generic
element in X . For a pair of random variables X and Y , we use PX(x) and PX|Y (x|y) to denote the marginal distribution
of X and the conditional distribution of X given Y , respectively. We also employ Xn to denote a sequence of n random
variables defined over X , and Xi to denote the ith random variable in Xn. The counting function N(x|Xn) records the number
of occurrences of the element x in the sequence Xn. The indicator function 1i(x|Xn) tells whether Xi is x. We may also
use 1i(x) instead of 1i(x|Xn) for simplicity, whenever the meaning is clear from the context. We may trivially extend the
aforementioned notations to a tuple of symbols drawn from the corresponding alphabets.
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Fig. 1: fU (u) and PU˜ (u˜), where (α1, β1, n
′) = (−5, 5, 100).
For the continuous random variables, and the random variables whose continuity or discreteness are not definitely known,
there are corresponding discrete random variables generated by quantifying the random variables. Let use the quantization
of continuous random variable U as an example as follows. Suppose one n′-length sequence u˜1, u˜2, . . . , u˜n′ . Then, for j =
1, . . . , n′, B (u˜j) denotes the domain consisting of u˜j . They satisfy the constraints as follows.
α1 = u˜1 < u˜2 < u˜3 . . . < u˜n′−1 = β1, β1 < u˜n′ , (1)
u˜j − u˜j−1 = β1 − α1
n′ − 2 , j = 2, 3, . . . , n
′ − 1, (2)
B (u˜j) =

(u˜j−1, u˜j ] , j = 2, 3, . . . , n′ − 1
(−∞, α1] , j = 1
(β1, +∞) , j = n′
, (3)
where α1 and β1 are assumed to depend on n′, 4u = β1−α1n′−2 , and limn′→∞4u = 0. Based on the definition of B (u˜j),
the continuous variable U can be quantized to discrete U˜ . In particular, if U ∈ B (u˜j), then U˜ = u˜j . In other words,
U˜ ,
∑n′
j=1 1 (U ∈ B (u˜j)) u˜j . Correspondingly, Un is quantized to U˜n, where U˜i ,
∑n′
j=1 1 (Ui ∈ B (u˜j)) u˜j . To illustrate
motivation of the proposed quantization, let us take an example where U follows standard Gaussian distribution, and it is
quantized to U˜ by setting (α1, β1, n′) = (−5, 5, 100). Fig. 1 presents the PDF and probability mass function (PMF) of U and
U˜ , i.e., fU (u) and PU˜ (u˜), respectively. It is observed that the curve of PU˜ (u˜) is similar to the curye of fU (u). PU˜ (u˜) could be
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Fig. 2: System model.
used for fitting fU (u). This observation motivates us to make the random variables be simulated by discrete variables, whose
discreteness facilitate our analysis work given later.
In this paper, U˜ is referred as quantized version of U . (α1, β1, n′) is referred as quantization parameter. We also term
above-mentioned quantization of U as that U is quantified according to (α1, β1, n′). These notations could be applied to
other random variables and their corresponding quantized versions. Obviously, the quantized variables are discrete, hence, their
notations follow the format of discrete variables given above. More details are listed in Table I.
B. Channel Model
Let us focus on the two-hop one-way relay example, where one source and one destination exchange information via a relay
system. The communication takes place in two stages. Each stage includes n instants. In the first n instants, the source sends
n-length sequence Sn to the relay node, S is a discrete random variable. Correspondingly, the relay observes n-length sequence
Un. Without loss of generalization, we assume that S is equiprobability binary symbol generated from alphabet (+1,−1) The
channel from the source to the relay is specified by U = h1S+Nr, where U is the received signal of the relay in each instant,
h1 is the constant channel coefficient, and Nr is AWGN existed in the channel. Nr is random variables following standard
Gaussian distribution. Then, the pdf of U conditioned on S = s is given as
fU |S (u |s ) = 1√
2pi
exp
(
− (u− h1s)
2
2
)
. (4)
Meanwhile, due to the open nature of wireless scenario, the destination could hear sequence Xn from the direct channel.
The direct channel is specified by X = h3S+Nd, where h3 is the constant coefficient of the direct channel, and Nd is standard
AWGN existed in the direct channel.
fX|S (x |s ) = 1√
2pi
exp
(
− (x− h3s)
2
2
)
. (5)
7TABLE I: Notation Table
S Source symbol, S ∈ {−1, 1}
U Symbol received by the relay, U ∈ (−∞, +∞)
V Symbol forwarded by the relay, V ∈ (−∞, +∞)
Y The destination’s received symbol from the relay, Y ∈ (−∞, +∞)
X The destination’s received symbol from the source, X ∈ (−∞, +∞)
U˜ Quantized version of U according to
(
α1, β1, n
′), please refer to (1)-(3) for detailed definition.
V˜
Quantized version of V according to (α2, β2, nv), V˜ ,
∑n′
j=1 1 (V ∈ B (v˜j)) v˜j , where
α2 = v˜1 < v˜2 < v˜3 . . . < v˜nv−1 = β2, β2 < v˜nv
v˜j − v˜j−1 = β2−α2nv−2 , j = 2, 3, . . . , nv − 1,
B (v˜j) =

(v˜j−1, v˜j ] , j = 2, 3, . . . , nv − 1
(−∞, α2] , j = 1
(β2, +∞) , j = ny
Y˜
Quantized version of Y according to (αy, βy, ny), Y˜ ,
∑n′
j=1 1 (Y ∈ B (y˜j)) y˜j , where
α3 = y˜1 < y˜2 < y˜3 . . . < y˜ny−1 = βy, β3 < y˜ny
y˜j − y˜j−1 = β3−α3ny−2 , j = 2, 3, . . . , ny − 1,
B (y˜j) =

(y˜j−1, y˜j ] , j = 2, 3, . . . , ny − 1
(−∞, α3] , j = 1
(β3, +∞) , j = ny
X˜
Quantized version of X according to (α4, β4, nx), Y˜ ,
∑n′
j=1 1 (X ∈ B (˜xj)) x˜j , where
α4 = x˜1 < x˜2 < x˜3 . . . < x˜nx−1 = βx, β4 < x˜nx
x˜j − x˜j−1 = β4−α4nx−2 , j = 2, 3, . . . , nx − 1,
B (˜xj) =

(˜xj−1, y˜j ] , j = 2, 3, . . . , nx − 1
(−∞, α4] , j = 1
(β4, +∞) , j = nx
S, U˜ , V˜ , Y˜ , X˜ Alphabets of S, U˜ , V˜ , Y˜ , and X˜ , respectively
si, u˜i, v˜i, y˜i, x˜i The i-th elements in S, U˜ , V˜ , Y˜ , and X˜ , respectively
s, u˜, v˜, y˜, x˜ Generic elements in S, U˜ , V˜ , Y˜ , and X˜ , respectively
PU˜ (u˜) PMF of U˜
1i
(
V˜i = v˜k
)
Indicator of whether V˜i = v˜k is true or not
1i
(
U˜i = u˜j
)
Indicator of whether U˜i = v˜j is true or not
N
(
u˜j
∣∣∣U˜n ) ∑ni 1i (u˜j ∣∣∣U˜n )
P
U˜|X˜ (u˜j |˜x ) Conditional probability of
{
U˜ = u˜j
}
given
{
X˜ = x˜
}
4u, 4v 4u = β1−α1n′−2 , 4v =
β2−α2
nv−2
Φ (·) pulse response function
Based on (4) and (5), the PDF of U conditioned on X is given by
fU |X (u |x ) =
2∑
i=1
PS|X (si |x ) fU |S (u |si ) , (6)
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Fig. 3: An instance of quantization setup employed by Section II. C, where each B (u˜j) (j = 1, . . . , n′) is included by one of
{B (v˜1) ,B (v˜2) , . . . ,B (v˜nv )} in whole.
where fU |S (u |si ) is given by (4), and PS|X (si |x ) =
exp
(
− (x−h3si)
2
2
)
∑2
j=1 exp
(
− (x−h3sj)
2
2
) . We assume the channels from source to relay
and to destination are stationary and memoryless. As a result, Un and Xn are i.i.d. sequences, we thus have fUn|Xn (un |xn ) =∏n
i=1 fU |X (ui |xi ), where ui and xi are the i-th symbol of generic sequences un and xn, respectively.
Secondly, in the instants n+ 1, n+ 2, . . . , 2n, the relay forwards sequence V n to the destination. V is the variable denoting
the forwarded signal of the relay. Depending on the relay’s attack act, the alphabet of V may be discrete or continuous.
Furthermore, we allow the relay to conduct arbitrary attacks as long as Xn, Un, and V n satisfy a markov constraint, i.e.,
fV n|Un,Xn (vn |un, xn ) = fV n|Un (vn |un ). It indicates the relay conducts attacks only upon its own observation.
The channel from the relay to the destination is specified by Y = h2V +N ′d where h2 is the constant channel coefficient, N
′
d
is standard AWGN existed in the channel. The pdf of Y conditioned on V is given as fY |V (y |v ) = 1√2pi exp
(
− (y−h2v)22
)
.
Correspondingly, the cumulative distribution function (cdf) of Y conditioned on V is given as
FY |V (t |v ) =
∫ t
−∞
1√
2pi
exp
(
− (y − h2v)
2
2
)
dy. (7)
We assume the destination knows fU |X (u |x ) and FY |V (t |v ) for facilitating attack detection.
(
fU |X (u |x ) , FY |V (t |v )
)
is referred as to observation channel. In the instants n + 1, n + 2, . . . , 2n, the destination receives sequence Y n from the
relay. The channel from the relay to the destination is also stationary and memoryless, thus pdf of Yi given V n is given by
fYi|V n (y |vn ) = fY |V (y |vi ), where vi is the i-th symbol of sequence vn, Yi denotes the i-th variable in random sequence
Y n.
9C. Attack Model
The potential malicious relay receives sequence Un, and then forwards sequence V n. The relay may perform arbitrary
attacks, including i.i.d. and non-i.i.d. attacks, while the parameter of attack is unknown to the destination. Thus, V n may be
a non-i.i.d. sequence, and distribution of Un and V n, i.e., fV n,Un (vn, un), is also unknown to the destination. This property
motivates us to develop a non-parameter method to model the attacks.
For modeling the attack, we first notice the U is continuous random variable. The alphabet of V is not definite, it is possible
to be any arbitrary value in (−∞, +∞). We quantize U and V according to quantized parameters (α1, β1, n′) and (α2, β2, nv)
where α2, β2, where nv depend on n′, nv approaches to infinity as n′ → ∞, and then get quantized variables U˜ and V˜ ,
respectively. Furthermore, to describe the maliciousness of relay, nv and n′ are properly chosen such that for j = 1, 2, . . . , n′
and k = 1, 2, . . . , nv , B (u˜j) and B (v˜k) have either B (u˜j) ⊆ B (v˜k) or B (u˜j)
⋂B (v˜k) = ∅. We illustrate an instance of this
quantization setup in Fig. 3.
Based on the quantization, the function 4F (n′)
V˜ n|U˜n (v |u ) for sequence pair (U
n, V n) is defined as
4F (n′)
V˜ n|U˜n (v |u ) =

∑n
i=1 1i(V˜i=v˜k)1i(U˜i=u˜j)
N(u˜j|U˜n ) , N
(
u˜j
∣∣∣U˜n) 6= 0, u ∈ B (u˜j) , v ∈ B (v˜k)
0, otherwise
, (8)
where
∑n
i=1 1i(V˜i=v˜k)1i(U˜i=u˜j)
N(u˜j|U˜n ) is the empirical transition probability from {U˜ = u˜j} to {V˜ = v˜k}. Consider the case that the
probability is strictly non-zero while B (u˜j)
⋂B (v˜k) = ∅, then it indicates the relay partly modifies its received symbol (i.e.,
U ) that belongs to B (u˜j) to another disparate domain B (v˜k). To be more precise, if the relay is absolutely reliable, we must
always have
∑nv
j=1
∑n′
i=1
∣∣∣∣4F (n′)V˜ n|U˜n (v˜j |u˜i )− [W (n′)0 ]i,j
∣∣∣∣ = 0, where
[
W
(n′)
0
]
i,j
=

1, B (u˜i) ⊆ B (v˜j)
0, otherwise
(9)
From this intuitively understanding, the malicious relay is defined as follows.
Definition 1. (Malicious Relay) The relay is said to be non-malicious if
∑nv
j=1
∑n′
i=1
∣∣∣∣4F (n′)V˜ n|U˜n (v˜j |u˜i )− [W (n′)0 ]i,j
∣∣∣∣ → 0 in
probability as n and n′ approach to infinity. Otherwise, the relay is considered malicious.
Note that Definition 1 mainly tolerates two kinds of manipulation. In the one manipulating scenario, the modification always
makes U 6= V as well as B
(
U˜
)
⊆ B
(
V˜
)
. In other words, when the relay receives a symbol of B (u˜i), and according to the
quantization setup, there exists j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , nv} satisfying B (u˜i) ⊆ B (v˜j). Then, the relay modifies the symbol to arbitrary
10
another symbol that belongs to B (v˜j). It yields to
4F (n
′)
V˜ n|U˜n (v˜j |u˜i ) =

1, B (u˜i) ⊆ B (v˜j)
0, otherwise
(10)
for i = 1, . . . , n′ and j = 1, . . . , nv . According to Definition 1, such modification is considered to be non-malicious. The
modification is conducted within B (v˜). As n and nv approach to infinity, we have |U − V | ≤ βv−αvnv−2 in probability. Hence,
for sufficient large n and nv , the modification error is controllable and negligible.
In another manipulating scenario, the relay only modifies negligible fraction of symbols, such that 4F (n
′)
V˜ n|U˜n (v˜j |u˜i ) is
close to
[
W
(n′)
0
]
i,j
for i = 1, . . . , n′ and j = 1, . . . , nv . This relaxation has essentially no effect on the information rate from
the source to the destination across the relay. We allow these two kinds of manipulation for mathematical convenience.
Recall from Section II.B that in the instants n+1, n+2, . . . , 2n, the relay transmits V n to the destination. Conrrespondingly,
the destination observes Y n from the relay. On the other hand, in the instants 1, 2, . . . , n, the destination also observes Xn
from the source. The destination is free to use Y n and Xn to detect the existence of malicious relay. Since Xn is delivered
via the direct channel, it is guaranteed not to be attacked and is statistically correlated to Y n when the relay is non-malicious.
Thus, Xn could work as secured SI to check whether Y n is attacked by the relay. In particular, the destination uses Xn and
Y n for getting functions
Fn
Y n|X˜n (t |˜x ) =

∑n
i=1 1i(Yi<t)1i(X˜i=x˜)
N(x˜|X˜n ) , N
(
x˜
∣∣∣X˜n) 6= 0,
0, otherwise
. (11)
Then, in lemma 6, we will show that as n→∞, n′ →∞, the convergence
Fn
Y n|X˜n (t |˜x )→
nv∑
k=1
n′∑
j=1
PU˜|X˜ (u˜j |˜x )4F
(n′)
V˜ n|U˜n (v˜k |u˜j )FY |V (t |v˜k ) (12)
is established in probability for arbitrary value of t and arbitrary distribution of
{
V˜ n, U˜n
}
. The convergence characterized
by (12) allows the destination to determine whether
∑nv
j=1
∑n′
i=1
∣∣∣∣4F (n′)V˜ n|U˜n (v˜j |u˜i )− [W (n′)0 ]i,j
∣∣∣∣ is far away from 0 or not by
using its observation of Fn
Y n|X˜n (t |˜x ). In other words, the attack detection could be implemented based on physical-layer
observation, i.e., Xn and Y n. We will propose the detection method only using Xn and Y n, and prove that as n → ∞, the
error probability of the proposed detection method approaches to 0.
III. MAIN RESULTS
Notice that the convergence (12) could be rewrote as
Fn
Y n|X˜n (t |˜x )→
nv∑
k=1
n′∑
j=1
PU˜|X˜ (u˜j |˜x )
4u
4F (n′)
V˜ n|U˜n (v˜k |u˜j )
4v FY |V (t |v˜k )4v4u (13)
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where we set that nv approaches to infinity as n′ →∞, hence limn′→∞4u = 0, and limn′→∞4v = 0. On the other hand,
we will also prove that the convergence (12) is established for arbitrary sufficient large n′. Then, according to the definition
of integral, for sufficient large n′, we could get that
Fn
Y n|X˜n (t |˜x )→
∫ β1
α1
∫ β2
α2
fU |X (u |x ) f (n
′)
V˜ n|U˜n (v |u )FY |V (y |v ) dudv (14)
where x ∈ B (x˜), f (n′)
V˜ n|U˜n (v |u ) =
4F (n′)
V˜ n|U˜n (v|u )
4v . Furthermore, if f
(n′)
V˜ n|U˜n (v |u ) converges to limn′→∞ f
(n′)
V˜ n|U˜n (v |u ) as
n′ →∞, we could also obtain that
Fn
Y n|X˜n (t |˜x )→
∫ +∞
−∞
∫ +∞
−∞
fU |X (u |x ) lim
n′→∞
f
(n′)
V˜ n|U˜n (v |u )FY |V (y |v ) dudv. (15)
Either (14) or (15) indicates the observation channel
(
fU |X (u |x ) , FY |V (t |v )
)
plays a key role to the attack detection using
observation of Fn
Y n|X˜n (t |˜x ). Intuitively, if observation channel
(
fU |X (u |x ) , FY |V (t |v )
)
makes limn′→∞ f
(n′)
V˜ n|U˜n (v |u ) =
Φ (v − u) is the single pdf solution to∫ +∞
−∞
∫ +∞
−∞
fU |X (u |x ) lim
n′→∞
f
(n′)
V˜ n|U˜n (v |u )FY |V (y |v ) dudv =
∫ +∞
−∞
fU |X (u |x )FY |V (y |u ) du,
then the destination is able to determine whether limn′→∞ f
(n′)
V˜ n|U˜n (v |u ) is far away from Φ (v − u) or not by comparing∫ +∞
−∞ fU |X (u |x )FY |V (y |u ) du with FnY n|X˜n (t |˜x ). Obviously, the distance between limn′→∞ f
(n′)
V˜ n|U˜n (v |u ) and Φ (v − u)
indicates maliciousness of the relay. As a beneficial result, the attacks are detectable upon Fn
Y n|X˜n (t |˜x ). This intuition leads
to the following dichotomy on all AWGN observation channels.
Definition 2. Non-manipulable AWGN Relay Channel The observation channel
(
fU |X (u |x ) , FY |V (y |v )
)
is non-manipulable,
if there exists function Ψ (v |u ) that satisfies the following three conditions
1) Ψ (v |u ) is a conditional pdf.
2) Ψ (v |u ) 6= Φ (v − u).
3)
∫ +∞
−∞
∫ +∞
−∞ fU|X (u |x ) Ψ (v |u )FY |V (y |v ) dudv =
∫ +∞
−∞ fU|X (u |x )FY |V (y |u ) du.
Otherwise, the observation channel
(
fU |X (u |x ) , FY |V (y |v )
)
is non-manipulable. The following theorem will show the
non-manipulability of relay network is equivalent to the detectability of maliciousness.
Theorem 1. (Maliciousness detectability ) The observation channel
(
fU |X (u |x ) , FY |V (y |v )
)
is non-manipulable is a
necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a sequence of decision statistics {Dn} simultaneously having the
following two properties:
Fix any sufficiently small δ > 0,  > 0, there has sufficiently large n′,
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1) limn→∞ Pr
(
Dn > ε(n′, δ)
∣∣∣∑nvj=1∑n′i=1 ∣∣∣∣4F (n′)V˜ n|U˜n (v˜j |u˜i )− [W (n′)0 ]i,j
∣∣∣∣ > δ) ≥ 1− whenever Pr(∑nvj=1∑n′i=1 ∣∣∣4F (n′)V˜ n|U˜n (v˜j |u˜i )−[
W
(n′)
0
]
i,j
∣∣∣ > δ) > 0, where ε(n′, δ) is strictly positive and can be arbitrary small.
2) limn→∞ Pr
(
Dn > µ′(n′, δ)
∣∣∣∑nvj=1∑n′i=1 ∣∣∣∣4F (n′)V˜ n|U˜n (v˜j |u˜i )− [W (n′)0 ]i,j
∣∣∣∣ ≤ δ) ≤  whenever Pr(∑nvj=1∑n′i=1 ∣∣∣4F (n′)V˜ n|U˜n (v˜j |u˜i )−[
W
(n′)
0
]
i,j
∣∣∣ < δ) > 0, where µ′(n′, δ)→ 0 as n′ →∞, δ → 0.
The properties 1) and 2) of Theorem 1 together imply that we have Dn → 0 in probability if the relay network is safe. To
elaborate a little further, for a relay network in which the source’s observation channel is non-manipulable, it is theoretically
feasible to check whether the relay have conducted Byzantine attacks. Conversely, if the observation channel is manipulable,
the security of the relay network against Byzantine attacks may not be guaranteed by only checking the source’s observations.
Remark 1: Theorem 1 gives the detectability of continuous attacks over continuous channels. It extends the the detectability
of discrete attacks given by [16] into continuous form. This extension is not trivial based on twofold work of this paper.
Firstly, we prove the convergence of Fn
Y n|X˜n (t |˜x ) (24) is established for arbitrary sufficient large n
′ rather than fixed n′,
where the involved variables X˜ , U˜ , and V˜ do not follow markov constraint. For completing such proof work, it is not available
to straightforwardly use the methods of [16], which processes the discrete variables following markov constraint and having
fixed dimensions of their alphabets. Secondly, the checking problem for non-manipulability of continuous channel is to check
number of solutions to an integral equation. The method of [16] for checking non-manipulability of discrete channel is to
check number of solutions to an matrix equation. The checking method given by [16] cannot be used for integral equation.
In this paper, we will show almost all the continuous relay networks are non-manipulable as follows.
Proposition 1. (Non-manipulability of Networks With Nonzero-Coefficients) If and only if h1 6= 0, h2 6= 0 and h3 6= 0, the
observation channel
(
fU |X (u |x ) , FY |V (y |v )
)
is non-manipulable.
Obviously, the Proposition 1 indicates the non-manipulability is very common for the general AWGN relay networks. Jointly
considering Theorem 1 and Proposition 1, we attain that in almost all the AWGN relay networks, arbitrary attacks are detectable
by using physical-layer observation. Furthermore, according to Proposition 1, even the coefficient of direct channel, i.e., h3,
is very little yet nonzero, the observation channel is still non-manipulable. It indicates even the direct channel suffers deep
fading, the signal observed from the direct channel still can be used for attack detection and achieving asymptotically errorless
performance. According to Proposition 1, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 1. (Manipulability of AWGN Relay Networks Without Direct Channel) If the direct channel does not exist, i.e.,
h3 = 0, the observation channel
(
fU |X (u |x ) , FY |V (y |v )
)
is manipulable.
The proof of Corollary 1 is completed by setting Ψ (v |u ) = fU (v), then we have
∫ +∞
−∞
∫ +∞
−∞ fU|X (u |x ) Ψ (v |u )FY |V (y |v ) dudv =
13
∫ +∞
−∞ fU|X (u |x )FY |V (y |u ) du. According to Definition 2, the networks without direct channel is manipulable. From Theorem
1, the manipulability indicates in such networks, some attacks are not detectable upon observation of the destination. Recall
that the direct channel is specified by X = h3S + Nd. If h3 = 0, then X = Nd which is always statistical independent on
the observation from relay, Y n. Hence, Xn cannot work as SI to check Y n due to its loss of statistic dependence on Y n. It
also reflects the vulnerability of lacking SI. Proposition 1 and Corollary 1 jointly illustrate the necessity of utilizing SI. For
detectability of arbitrary attacks, SI is allowed to be little, but cannot be vacancy.
IV. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
We give three numerical examples in this section to illustrate the detectability results of Theorem 1, Proposition 1, and
Corollary 1. In all the examples, we assume that the source alphabet is binary. We employ decision statistic
Dn =
1
nx − 2
1
ny − 2
nx−1∑
k=1
ny−1∑
m=1
∣∣∣∣FnY n|X˜n (tm |˜xk )− ∫ +∞−∞ fU|X˜ (u |˜xk )FY |V (tm |u ) du
∣∣∣∣
for Byzantine attack detection in the examples.
We first consider the setup that h1 = h2 = h3 = 1. We term the direct channel as strong in the sense that its coefficient
is as large as relaying channel. According to Proposition 1, the considered channel is non-manipulable. Then, two different
attacks are considered. In the first attack, referred to as Attack 1, the relay conducts a non-i.i.d. attack by mapping its ith input
symbol Ui to Vi according to Vi = Ui − 1 when i is odd, and according to Vi = 2Ui − 1 when i is even. In the second attack
considered, referred to as Attack 2, relay makes V follow the distribution identical to U . Meanwhile, U and V are independent
with each other. Since the observation channel is non-manipulable, these two attacks are detectable.
We conduct computer simulation to illustrate the detectability of both attacks using Dn. The empirical CDFs of Dn obtained
from the simulation are plotted in Figs. 4 and 5 for Attack 1 and Attack 2, respectively. From these two figures, it is observed
that there are clear separations between the empirical CDFs of Dn for the non-malicious case and the malicious case of Attack
1 and Attack 2 when n = 103. This observation verifies sufficiency of non-manipulability for the detectability of attacks
promised by Theorem 1. Secondly, we consider the setup that h1 = h2 = 1, h3 = 0.01. We term the direct channel as weak in
the sense that its coefficient is much smaller than relaying channel. According to Proposition 1, this network with weak direct
channel is still non-manipulable. Based on Theorem 1, Attack 2 is detectable. We consider Attack 2 in computer simulation.
The empirical CDFs of Dn are plotted in Fig. 6. Similar to Figs. 4 and 5, it is also observed clear separations between the
empirical CDF of Dn for the non-malicious case and the malicious case of Attack 2. Nevertheless, this separation appears
when n = 105. This observation verifies sufficiency of non-manipulability for the detectability of attacks promised by Theorem
1. It also indicates the detection with weak direct channel needs much more observations than it with strong direct channel.
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Fig. 4: Empirical CDFs of Dn for Attack 1 in non-manipulable observation channel characterized by h1 = h2 = h3 = 1.
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Fig. 6: Empirical CDFs of Dn for Attack 2 in non-manipulable observation channel characterized by h1 = h2 = 1, h3 = 0.01.
Finally, we consider the setup that h1 = h2 = 1, h3 = 0. Under this setup, the direct channel is vacancy. According to
Proposition 1 and Corollary 1, this network is manipulable. Based on Theorem 1, we know that there some attacks are not
attackable in this network. In order to verify this, we simulated Attack 2 in such network. The empirical CDFs of Dn obtained
from the simulation is plotted in Fig. 7. It is seen from Fig. 7 that the CDFs are indistinguishable, regardless of the value
of n. As a result, from Dn, Attack 2 is not detectable. This observation verifies the necessity of non-manipulability for the
detectability of attacks promised by Theorem 1.
V. CONCLUSIONS
This paper considers attack detection problem in wireless relay system. We prove arbitrary attacks are detectable only using
physical-layer observations, as long as the system satisfies a non-manipulable condition. Then, we further prove that if and only
if the coefficients of all channels in the relay system are non-zero, the non-manipulability of the wireless system is guaranteed.
It indicates that using physical-layer observations, rather than any other secret-key or AMD code, wireless relay systems are
generally able to detect arbitrary attacks.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
Lemma 1. If h1 6= 0 and h3 6= 0, there does not exist any i.i.d attack making the statistical distribution of U conditioned on
X is equivalent to the statistical distribution of V conditioned on X .
Proof: Let us assume the manipulable wireless channel exists, which indicates there at least one i.i.d attack making the
statistical distribution of U conditioned on X is equivalent to the statistical distribution of V conditioned on X . Hence, we
have I (X;U) = I (X;V ), where I (·; ·) denotes mutual information between the two input variables. On the other hand,
(X,U, V ) forms a Markov chain as X → U → V . From Data-Processing Inequality, I (X;U) = I (X;V ) implies the Markov
chain X → V → U is also established. Then, let us use u and v to respectively denote arbitrary possible values of U and V ,
we have
Pr (U = u |V = v, X = a ) = Pr (U = u |V = v, X = b ) (16)
where a and b denote arbitrary value of X , a 6= b. Furthermore, Pr (U = u |V = v, X = a ) can be extended as
Pr (U = u |V = v, X = a ) = Pr (U = u, V = v, X = a)
Pr (V = v, X = a)
(17)
=
Pr (X = a) Pr (U = u |X = a ) Pr (V = v |U = u )
Pr (V = v, X = a)
=
fU|X (u |a ) Pr (V = v |U = u )
fU|X (v |a )
17
where the second equation follows the fact that X → U → V also forms a Markov chain. Similarly, Pr (U = u |V = v, X = b )
can be extended as
Pr (U = u |V = v, X = b ) = Pr (U = u, V = v, X = b)
Pr (V = v, X = b)
(18)
=
Pr (X = b) Pr (U = u |X = b ) Pr (V = v |U = u )
Pr (V = v, X = b)
=
fU|X (u |b ) Pr (V = v |U = u )
fU|X (v |b ) ,
where the second equation is again relying on the fact that X → U → V forms a Markov chain. Substituting (17) and (18)
into (16), we have
fU|X (u |a ) Pr (V = v |U = u )
fU|X (v |a ) =
fU|X (u |b ) Pr (V = v |U = u )
fU|X (v |b ) . (19)
Notice that (19) should be always established for arbitrary value of a and b. Thus, we have
lim
a→∞
fU |X (u |a ) Pr (V = v |U = u )
fU |X (v |a ) = limb→−∞
fU |X (u |b ) Pr (V = v |U = u )
fU |X (v |b ) . (20)
which could be further reshaped as
Pr (V = v |U = u ) lim
a→∞
fU |X (u |a )
fU |X (v |a ) = Pr (V = v |U = u ) limb→−∞
fU |X (u |b )
fU |X (v |b ) . (21)
Without loss of generality, we assume h3 > 0. Then, according to the expression of fU |X (u |x ), (21) becomes
exp
(
− (u+h1)2
2
)
Pr (V = v |U = u )
exp
(
− (v+h1)2
2
) = exp
(
− (u−h1)2
2
)
Pr (V = v |U = u )
exp
(
− (v−h1)2
2
) , (22)
which indicates
Pr (V = v |U = u )
exp (2h1u)
=
Pr (V = v |U = u )
exp (2h1v)
. (23)
Obviously, as h1 6= 0, if and only if Pr (V = v |U = u ) = 0 for u 6= v, (23) would be true. Then, for any attacks that
Pr (V = v |U = u ) 6= 0 for u 6= v, (23) would not be true, which contradicts to the assumption that there at least one i.i.d
attack making the statistical distribution of U conditioned on X1 is equivalent to the statistical distribution of V conditioned
on X1. Hence, the lemma is proved.
Lemma 2. For random variables Z1, Z2, Z3 Z4, Z5, where Z3 = Z1 + Z2, Z5 = Z4 + Z2, Z1 and Z4 are both stochastic
independent with Z2, if pdf fZ3|X˜ (z3 |˜x ) = fZ5|X˜ (z5 |˜x ), then there must have fZ1|X˜ (z1 |˜x ) = fZ4|X˜ (z4 |˜x ).
Proof: According to the fact that Z3 = Z1 + Z2, where Z1 and Z2 are stochastic independent with each other, then the
characteristic function of Z3 conditioned on X1 = x˜ is expressed by
ϕZ3|X˜ (t |˜x ) = ϕZ1|X˜ (t |˜x )ϕZ2|X˜ (t |˜x ) , (24)
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where ϕZ3|X˜ (t |˜x ), ϕZ1|X˜ (t |˜x ) and ϕZ2|X˜ (t |˜x ) denote the characteristic functions of Z3, Z2 and Z1 conditioned on X1 = x˜,
respectively. Similarly, according to the fact that Z5 = Z4 +Z2, where Z4 and Z2 are stochastic independent with each other,
then the characteristic function of Z5 conditioned on X1 = x˜ is expressed by
ϕZ5|X˜ (t |˜x ) = ϕZ4|X˜ (t |˜x )ϕZ2|X˜ (t |˜x ) , (25)
where ϕZ5|X˜ (t |˜x ) and ϕZ4|X˜ (t |˜x ) denote the characteristic functions of Z4 and Z2 conditioned on X1 = x˜, respectively.
Since fZ3|X˜ (z3 |˜x ) = fZ5|X˜ (z5 |˜x ), we have
ϕZ3|X˜ (t |˜x ) = ϕZ5|X˜ (t |˜x ) (26)
Substituting (24) and (25) into (24), we get
ϕZ4|X˜ (t |˜x )ϕZ2|X˜ (t |˜x ) = ϕZ1|X˜ (t |˜x )ϕZ2|X˜ (t |˜x ) . (27)
Since ϕZ2|X˜ (t |˜x )is characteristic function which always attains strictly non-zero value across t ∈ (−∞,+∞), then we have
ϕZ4|X˜ (t |˜x ) = ϕZ1|X˜ (t |˜x ) . (28)
From the knowledge that pdf can be uniquely determined by characteristic function, (28) indicates
fZ1|X˜ (z1 |˜x ) = fZ4|X˜ (z4 |˜x ) . (29)
Let us back to the proof of Proposition 1. Revisiting Y = h2V + Ns, based on Lemma 1, if and only if the relay is
absolutely reliable, i.e., U = V , we can get fU|X (u |x ) = fV |X (v |x ). Since h2 is a nonzero constant, we can easily get that
if and only if U = V , fh2U|X (h2u |x ) = fh2V |X (h2v |x ) holds true. Jointly consider that Lemma 2 indicates if and only if
fh2U|X (h2u |x ) = fh2V |X (h2v |x ), there exists fh2U+Ns|X (y |x ) = fh2V+Ns|X (y |x ). We finally get that if and only if U = V ,
fh2U+Ns|X (y |x ) = fh2V+Ns|X (y |x ) holds true. Hence, the proposition 1 is proved.
APPENDIX B
NECESSITY PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Proof: Based on Definition 2, for manipulable observation channel, there exists∫ +∞
−∞
∫ +∞
−∞
fU |X (u |x ) Ψ (v |u )FY |V (y |v ) dudv =
∫ +∞
−∞
fU |X (u |x )FY |V (y |u ) du (30)
where Ψ (v |u ) 6= Φ (v − u). Then, we consider the following two cases.
1) In case I, the relay reliably forwards symbols according to U = V , the destination observes Y n from the relay, and
observes Xn from the source.
2) In case II, the relay conducts i.i.d. attack according to fV |U (v |u ) = Ψ (v |u ). For easy description, we use Y ′n and
X ′n to denote the destination’s observation from the relay and from the source, respectively.
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Obviously, in case I, the relay is reliable. Under the condition that case I occurs, decision statistics Dn are constructed upon
on {Y n, Xn}. In case II, the relay is malicious. Under the condition that case II occurs, decision statistics Dn are constructed
upon on {Y ′n, X ′n}. According to (30), it is not hard to check that {Y ′n, X ′n} and {Y n, Xn} follow the same distribution.
Then, any decision statistics Dn constructed upon on {Y ′n, X ′n} and {Y n, Xn} must follow the same distribution. Hence,
if there exists Dn satisfies the second property of Theorem 1, limn→∞ Pr
(
Dn > µ′(n′, δ)
∣∣∣case I) ≤ , there must have
limn→∞ Pr
(
Dn > µ′(n′, δ)
∣∣∣case II) ≤ . It indicates the two properties of Theorem 1 cannot be satisfied simultaneously.
APPENDIX C
SUFFICIENCY PROOF OF THEOREM 1
A. Preparations
For easy description of our proof, we first define some functions and values as follows.
4Fn
V˜ n|X˜n (v |˜x ) =

∑n
i=1 1i(V˜i=v˜k)1i(X˜i=x˜)
N(x˜|X˜n ) , N
(
x˜
∣∣∣X˜n) 6= 0, v ∈ B (v˜k)
0, otherwise
(31)
Fn
Y n|X˜n (t |˜x ) =

∑n
i=1 1i(Yi<t)1i(X˜i=x˜)
N(x˜|X˜n ) , N
(
x˜
∣∣∣X˜n) 6= 0,
0, otherwise
(32)
FY |V (t |v ) =
∫ t
−∞
fY |V (y |v ) dy (33)
For k = 1, 2, . . . , nv , vk denotes generic value belonging to B (v˜k).
In order to prove one convergence property given later, we also define
4Fi,i′,j,j′ = PX˜i,X˜i′ |V˜i,V˜i′ ,U˜i,U˜i′ {x˜, x˜ |v˜k, v˜k, u˜j , u˜j′ } − PX˜|U˜ (x˜ |u˜j )PX˜i′ |V˜i,V˜i′ ,U˜i,U˜i′ {x˜ |v˜k, v˜k, u˜j , u˜j′ }
− PX˜i|V˜i,V˜i′ ,U˜i,U˜i′ {x˜ |v˜k, v˜k, u˜j , u˜j′ }PX˜|U˜ (x˜ |u˜j′ ) + PX˜|U˜ (x˜ |u˜j )PX˜|U˜ (x˜ |u˜j′ )
where i 6= i′, j, j′ = 1, 2, . . . n′, i, i′ = 1, 2, . . . n. Then, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 3. If we choose α1 = −β1, and β1 =
√
n′, then upon this setup, there also exist a upper bound for Fi,i′j,j′ across
j, j′ = 2, . . . n′ − 1, i, i′ = 1, 2, 3, . . . n, i 6= i′. This upper bound only depends on n′ rather than n. Hence, we denote the
upper bound as 4Fmax (n′). 4Fmax (n′) has property that
n′k4Fmax (n′)→ 0 (34)
where k is strictly less than 12 , i.e., k <
1
2 .
20
Proof: To bound 4Fi,i′j,j′ , we have
PX˜|U˜ (x˜ |u˜j ) =
∫
u∈B(u˜j) PX˜|U (x˜ |u ) fU (u) du∫
u∈B(u˜j) fU (u) du
(35)
which indicates
min
u∈B(u˜j)
PX˜|U (x˜ |u ) ≤ PX˜|U˜ (x˜ |u˜j ) ≤ maxu∈B(u˜j)PX˜|U (x˜ |u ) . (36)
On the other hand, since
PX˜i|V˜i,V˜i′ ,U˜i,U˜i′ {x˜ |v˜k, v˜k, u˜j , u˜j′ } =∫
v∈B(v˜k)
∫
v′∈B(v˜k)
∫
u∈B(u˜j)
∫
u′∈B(u˜j′)
PX˜|U (x˜ |u ) fUi,Ui′ |Vi,Vi′ (u, u
′ |v, v′ ) fVi,Vi′ (vi, vi′) dudu′dvdv′∫
v∈B(v˜k)
∫
v′∈B(v˜k′)
∫
u∈B(u˜j)
∫
u′∈B(u˜j′)
fUi,Ui′ |Vi,Vi′ (u, u′ |v, v′ ) fVi,Vi′ (vi, vi′) dudu′dvdv′
and
PX˜i,X˜i′ |V˜i,V˜i′ ,U˜i,U˜i′ {x˜, x˜ |v˜k, v˜k, u˜j , u˜j′ } =∫
v∈B(v˜k)
∫
v′∈B(v˜k)
∫
u∈B(u˜j)
∫
u′∈B(u˜j′)
PX˜|U (x˜ |u )PX˜|U (x˜ |u ) fUi,Ui′ |Vi,Vi′ (u, u
′ |v, v′ ) fVi,Vi′ (vi, vi′) dudu′dvdv′∫
v∈B(v˜k)
∫
v′∈B(v˜k′)
∫
u∈B(u˜j)
∫
u′∈B(u˜j′)
fUi,Ui′ |Vi,Vi′ (u, u′ |v, v′ ) fVi,Vi′ (vi, vi′) dudu′dvdv′
,
we have
min
u∈B(u˜j)
PX˜|U (x˜ |u ) ≤ PX˜i|V˜i,V˜i′ ,U˜i,U˜i′ {x˜ |v˜k, v˜k, u˜j , u˜j′ } ≤ maxu∈B(u˜j)PX˜|U (x˜ |u ) (37)
and
PX˜i|V˜i,V˜i′ ,U˜i,U˜i′ {x˜ |v˜k, v˜k, u˜j , u˜j′ } minu∈B(u˜j)
PX˜|U (x˜ |u ) ≤ PX˜i,X˜i′ |V˜i,V˜i′ ,U˜i,U˜i′ {x˜, x˜ |v˜k, v˜k, u˜j , u˜j′ } (38)
≤ PX˜i|V˜i,V˜i′ ,U˜i,U˜i′ {x˜ |v˜k, v˜k, u˜j , u˜j′ } maxu∈B(u˜j)
PX˜|U (x˜ |u )
Jointly considering (36), (37) and (38), 4Fi,i′,j,j′ could be bound as
|4Fi,i′,j,j′ | ≤ max
u∈B(u˜j)
2P 2
X˜|U (x˜ |u )− min
u∈B(u˜j)
2P 2
X˜|U (x˜ |u ) .
Then, we have
max
j,j′=2,...n′−1,i,i′=1,2,...n,i6=i′
4Fi,i′j,j′ < max
j=2,3,...n′−1
2
(
max
u∈B(u˜j)
P 2
X˜|U (x˜ |u )− minu∈B(u˜j)P
2
X˜|U (x˜ |u )
)
, 4Fmax (n′) (39)
Then, we proceed to focus on the property of Fmax (n′). Revisiting the system model, for j = 2, 3, . . . , n′ − 1, we have
max
u∈B(u˜j)
P 2
X˜|U (x˜ |u )− min
u∈B(u˜j)
P 2
X˜|U (x˜ |u ) ≤ 2PX˜|U
(
x˜
∣∣u′j )P ′X˜|U (x˜ ∣∣u′j ) 2√n′n′ − 2 (40)
where u′j ∈ B (u˜j), P ′X˜|U (x˜ |u ) is derived function of PX˜|U (x˜ |u ). The maximum of P ′X˜|U (x˜ |u ) in (−∞,+∞) is bounded.
lim
n′→∞
n′k
(
max
u∈B(u˜j)
P 2
X˜|U (x˜ |u )− minu∈B(u˜j)P
2
X˜|U (x˜ |u )
)
≤ lim
n′→∞
n′k2PX˜|U
(
x˜
∣∣u′j )P ′X˜|U (x˜ ∣∣u′j ) 2√n′n′ − 2
= 0 (41)
where the last equality follows the fact that the maximum of P ′X˜|U
(
x˜
∣∣u′j ) and PX˜|U (x˜ ∣∣u′j ) in (−∞,+∞) is bounded, and
k is strictly less than 1/2. Finally, based on the definition of Fmax (n′) in (39), the statement of this lemma is immediate.
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Similar to the definition of 4Fi,i′,j,j′ and Lemma 3, we define
Gi,i′,k,k′ = PYi|V˜i,V˜i′ ,X˜i,X˜i′ (Yi < t |v˜k, v˜k′ , x˜, x˜ )
(
PYi′ |Yi,V˜i,V˜i′ ,X˜i,X˜i′ (Yi′ < t |Yi < t, v˜k, v˜k′ , x˜, x˜ )− FY |V (t |vk′ )
)
− FY |V (t |vk )
(
PYi′ |V˜i,V˜i′ ,X˜i,X˜i′ (Yi′ < t |v˜k, v˜k′ , x˜, x˜ )− FY |V (t |vk′ )
)
(42)
where i 6= i′, k, k′ = 2, 3, . . . nv − 1, i, i′ = 1, 2, . . . n. Then, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 4. If we choose α2 = −β2, and β2 = √nv , then upon this setup, there also exist a upper bound for Gi,i′,k,k′ across
i 6= i′, k, k′ = 2, 3, . . . nv − 1, i, i′ = 1, 2, . . . n. This upper bound only depends on nv rather than nv . Hence, we denote the
upper bound as 4Gmax (nv). 4Gmax (nv) has property that
nτv4Gmax (nv)→ 0 (43)
where k is strictly less than 12 , i.e., τ <
1
2 .
Proof: Following the proof method employed by Lemma 3, the assertion is direct. More details are omitted due to space
limitation.
Lemma 5. For arbitrary v˜k, sufficiently small µ and ε ≤ µ2n′ ,
Pr
{∣∣∣∣4FnV˜ n|X˜n (v˜k |˜x )− ∫ +∞−∞ fU|X˜ (u |˜x )4F (n′)V˜ n|U˜n (v˜k |u ) du
∣∣∣∣ > µ}
<
4
µ2
n′2
n
+
1
Pr
{(
X˜n, U˜n
)
∈ Aε
}(
PX˜ (x˜)− ε
)24Fmax (n′)
+ Pr{(X˜n, U˜n) /∈ Aε} (44)
where
Aε =
(x˜n, u˜n) :
∣∣∣∣∣∣PU˜|X˜ (u˜ |˜x )−
N
(
u˜
∣∣∣U˜n )PX˜|U˜ (x˜ |u˜ )
N
(
x˜
∣∣∣X˜n )
∣∣∣∣∣∣ < ε,
∣∣∣∣∣∣PX˜ (x˜)−
N
(
x˜
∣∣∣X˜n )
n
∣∣∣∣∣∣ < ε
 . (45)
Proof: Notice that
Pr
{∣∣∣∣4FnV˜ n|X˜n (v˜k |˜x )− ∫ +∞−∞ fU|X˜ (u |˜x )4F (n′)V˜ n|U˜n (v˜k |u ) du
∣∣∣∣ > µ} (46)
< Pr
{∣∣∣∣4FnV˜ n|X˜n (v˜k |˜x )− ∫ +∞−∞ fU|X˜ (u |˜x )4F (n′)V˜ n|U˜n (v˜k |u ) du
∣∣∣∣ > µ ∣∣∣(X˜n, U˜n) ∈ Aε}+ Pr{(X˜n, U˜n) /∈ Aε}
Firstly notice that after n′, α1 and β1 are chosen and fixed properly,
Pr
{(
X˜n, U˜n
)
/∈ Aε
}
→ 0 (47)
as n approaches to infinity. Then, focusing on the first item in the right side of (46),
(
X˜n, U˜n
)
∈ Aε indicates N
(
u˜j
∣∣∣U˜n) > 0
for all j = 1, 2, . . . , n′. Hence,
∑n
i=1 1i(V˜i=v˜k)1i(U˜i=u˜j)
N(u˜j|U˜n ) is well-defined for all j = 1, 2, . . . , n
′. Under the condition
(
X˜n, U˜n
)
∈
Aε, we have∣∣∣∣4FnV˜ n|X˜n (v˜k |˜x )− ∫ +∞−∞ fU|X˜ (u |˜x )4F (n′)V˜ n|U˜n (v˜k |u ) du
∣∣∣∣ (48)
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑n
i=1 1i
(
V˜i = v˜k
)
1i
(
U˜i = u˜j
)
N
(
u˜j
∣∣∣U˜n ) −
n′∑
j=1
∑n
i=1 1i
(
V˜i = v˜k
)
1i
(
U˜i = u˜j
)
N
(
u˜j
∣∣∣U˜n )
∫
B(u˜j)
fU|X˜ (u |˜x ) du
∣∣∣∣∣∣
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=
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑n′
j=1
∑n
i=1 1i
(
V˜i = v˜k
)
1i
(
X˜i = x˜
)
1i
(
U˜i = u˜j
)
N
(
x˜
∣∣∣X˜n ) −
n′∑
j=1
∑n
i=1 1i
(
V˜i = v˜k
)
1i
(
U˜i = u˜j
)
N
(
u˜j
∣∣∣U˜n ) PU˜|X˜ (u˜j |˜x )
∣∣∣∣∣∣
Substituting (48) into the first item in the right side of (46), it becomes
Pr

∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑n′
j=1
∑n
i=1 1i
(
V˜i = v˜k
)
1i
(
X˜i = x˜
)
1i
(
U˜i = u˜j
)
N
(
x˜
∣∣∣X˜n ) −
n′∑
j=1
∑n
i=1 1i
(
V˜i = v˜k
)
1i
(
U˜i = u˜j
)
N
(
u˜j
∣∣∣U˜n ) PU˜|X˜ (u˜j |˜x )
∣∣∣∣∣∣ > µ
∣∣∣(X˜n, U˜n) ∈ Aε

(49)
< Pr

∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
n′∑
j=1
∑ni=1 1i
(
V˜i = v˜k
)
1i
(
X˜i = x˜
)
1i
(
U˜i = u˜j
)
n
(
PX˜ (x)− ε
) − ∑ni=1 1i
(
V˜i = v˜k
)
1i
(
U˜i = u˜j
)
PX˜|U˜ (x˜ |u˜j )
n
(
PX˜ (x)− ε
)

︸ ︷︷ ︸
Hj
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
>
µ
2
∣∣∣(X˜n, U˜n) ∈ Aε

+
n′∑
j=1
Pr

∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑n
i=1 1i
(
V˜i = v˜k
)
1i
(
U˜i = u˜j
)
N
(
u˜j
∣∣∣U˜n ) PU˜|X˜ (u˜j |˜x )−
∑n
i=1 1i
(
V˜i = v˜k
)
1i
(
U˜i = u˜j
)
PX˜|U˜ (x˜ |u˜j )
N
(
x˜
∣∣∣X˜n )
∣∣∣∣∣∣ > µ2n′
∣∣∣(X˜n, U˜n) ∈ Aε

The second item in the right of (49) can be further bound as
Pr

∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑n
i=1 1i
(
V˜i = v˜k
)
1i
(
U˜i = u˜j
)
N
(
u˜j
∣∣∣U˜n ) PU˜|X˜ (u˜j |˜x )−
∑n
i=1 1i
(
V˜i = v˜k
)
1i
(
U˜i = u˜j
)
PX˜|U˜ (x˜ |u˜j )
N
(
x˜
∣∣∣X˜n )
∣∣∣∣∣∣ > µ2n′
∣∣∣(X˜n, U˜n) ∈ Aε

(50)
≤ Pr

∣∣∣∣∣∣PU˜|X˜ (u˜j |˜x )−
N
(
u˜
∣∣∣U˜n )PX˜|U˜ (x˜ |u˜j )
N
(
x˜
∣∣∣X˜n )
∣∣∣∣∣∣ > µ2n′
∣∣∣(X˜n, U˜n) ∈ Aε
 = 0
where the last equality follows the definition of Aε and set of ε ≤ µ2n′ . From (50), the second item in the right of (49) equals
to 0. Then, we proceed to bound the first item in the right of (49) as
Pr

∣∣∣∣∣∣
n′∑
j=1
Hj
∣∣∣∣∣∣ > µ2
∣∣∣(X˜n, U˜n) ∈ Aε
 < 4µ2EAε
∣∣∣∣∣∣
n′∑
j=1
Hj
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
=
4
µ2
n′∑
j=1
n′∑
j′=1
EAε (HjHj′) (51)
which follows the Chebyshev theorem. EAε (·) indicates the expectation of its input conditioned on
(
X˜n, U˜n
)
∈ Aε.
EAε (HjHj′) =
EAε
(∑n
i=1 1i
(
V˜i = v˜k
)
1i
(
U˜i = u˜j
)(
1i
(
X˜i = x˜
)
− PX˜|U˜ (x˜ |u˜j )
))(∑n
i=1 1i
(
V˜i = v˜k
)
1i
(
U˜i = u˜j′
)(
1i
(
X˜i = x˜
)
− PX˜|U˜ (x˜ |u˜j′ )
))
n2
(
PX˜ (x)− ε
)2
≤
∑n
i=1EAε
{
1i
(
V˜i = v˜k
)
1i
(
U˜i = u˜j
)(
1i
(
X˜i = x˜
)
− PX˜|U˜ (x˜ |u˜j )
)
1i
(
U˜i = u˜j′
)(
1i
(
X˜i = x˜
)
− PX˜|U˜ (x˜ |u˜j′ )
)}
n2
(
PX˜ (x)− ε
)2
+
E
∑n
i=1
∑n
i=1,i′ 6=i 1i
(
V˜i = v˜k
)
1i
(
U˜i = u˜j
)
1i′
(
V˜i′ = v˜k
)
1i′
(
U˜i′ = u˜j′
)(
1i
(
X˜i = x˜
)
− PX˜|U˜ (x˜ |u˜j )
)(
1i′
(
X˜i′ = x˜
)
− PX˜|U˜ (x˜ |u˜j′ )
)
Pr
{(
X˜n, U˜n
)
∈ Aε
}
n2
(
PX˜ (x)− ε
)2
≤ 1
n
+
∑n
i=1
∑n
i=1,i′ 6=iE
{
1i
(
V˜i = v˜k
)
1i
(
U˜i = u˜j
)
1i′
(
V˜i′ = v˜k
)
1i′
(
U˜i′ = u˜j′
)
1i
(
X˜i = x˜
)
1i′
(
X˜i′ = x˜
)}
Pr
{(
X˜n, U˜n
)
∈ Aε
}
n2
(
PX˜ (x)− ε
)2
−
∑n
i=1
∑n
i=1,i′ 6=iE
{
1i
(
V˜i = v˜k
)
1i
(
U˜i = u˜j
)
1i′
(
V˜i′ = v˜k
)
1i′
(
U˜i′ = u˜j′
)
1i′
(
X˜i′ = x˜
)}
PX˜|U˜ (x˜ |u˜j )
Pr
{(
X˜n, U˜n
)
∈ Aε
}
n2
(
PX˜ (x)− ε
)2
−
∑n
i=1
∑n
i=1,i′ 6=iE
{
1i
(
V˜i = v˜k
)
1i
(
U˜i = u˜j
)
1i′
(
V˜i′ = v˜k
)
1i′
(
U˜i′ = u˜j′
)
1i
(
X˜i = x˜
)}
PX˜|U˜ (x˜ |u˜j′ )
Pr
{(
X˜n, U˜n
)
∈ Aε
}
n2
(
PX˜ (x)− ε
)2
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+
∑n
i=1
∑n
i=1,i′ 6=iE
{
1i
(
V˜i = v˜k
)
1i
(
U˜i = u˜j
)
1i′
(
V˜i′ = v˜k
)
1i′
(
U˜i′ = u˜j′
)}
PX˜|U˜ (x˜ |u˜j )PX˜|U˜ (x˜ |u˜j′ )
Pr
{(
X˜n, U˜n
)
∈ Aε
}
n2
(
PX˜ (x)− ε
)2
=
1
n
+
∑n
i=1
∑n
i=1,i′ 6=i PV˜i,V˜i′ ,U˜i,U˜i′ {v˜k, v˜k, u˜j , u˜j}4Fi,i′j,j′
Pr
{(
X˜n, U˜n
)
∈ Aε
}
n2
(
PX˜ (x)− ε
)2 (52)
Substituting (52) into (51), we have
Pr

∣∣∣∣∣∣
n′∑
j=1
Hj
∣∣∣∣∣∣ > µ2
∣∣∣(X˜n, U˜n) ∈ Aε
 < 4µ2
n′∑
j=1
n′∑
j′=1
 1n +
∑n
i=1
∑n
i=1,i′ 6=i PVi,Vi′ ,U˜i,U˜i′ {v˜k, v˜k, u˜j , u˜j}
Pr
{(
X˜n, U˜n
)
∈ Aε
}
n2
(
PX˜ (x)− ε
)2 4Fmax (n′)

≤ 4
µ2
n′2
n
+
∑n
i=1
∑n
i=1,i′ 6=i
∑n′
j=1
∑n′
j′=1 PU˜ {u˜j}PU˜ {u˜j′}
Pr
{(
X˜n, U˜n
)
∈ Aε
}
n2
(
PX˜ (x)− ε
)2 4Fmax (n′)

≤ 4
µ2
n′2
n
+
1
Pr
{(
X˜n, U˜n
)
∈ Aε
}(
PX˜ (x)− ε
)24Fmax (n′)
 (53)
From (53) (50) (49) and (46), we have
Pr
{∣∣∣∣4FnV n|X˜n (v˜k |˜x )− ∫ +∞−∞ fU|X˜ (u |˜x )4F (n′)V n|U˜n (v˜k |u ) du
∣∣∣∣ > µ}
<
4
µ2
n′2
n
+
1
Pr
{(
X˜n, U˜n
)
∈ Aε
}(
PX˜ (x)− ε
)24Fmax (n′)
+ Pr{(X˜n, U˜n) /∈ Aε} (54)
The proof is finished.
Upon the aforementioned lemmas, the following assertion convergence property can be proved.
Lemma 6. For arbitrary t, sufficiently small µ and ε ≤ µ4n′nv ,
Pr

∣∣∣∣∣∣FnY n|X˜n (t |˜x )−
nv∑
k=1
n′∑
j=1
PU˜|X˜ (u˜j |˜x )4F
(n′)
V˜ n|U˜n (v˜k |u˜j )FY |V (t |vk )
∣∣∣∣∣∣ > µ
 (55)
Proof: Notice that
Pr

∣∣∣∣∣∣FnY n|X˜n (t |˜x )−
nv∑
k=1
n′∑
j=1
PU˜|X˜ (u˜j |˜x )4F
(n′)
V˜ n|U˜n (v˜k |u˜j )FY |V (t |vk )
∣∣∣∣∣∣ > µ
 < (56)
Pr
{∣∣∣∣∣FnY n|X˜n (t |˜x )−
nv∑
k=1
4Fn
V˜ n|X˜n (v˜k |˜x )FY |V (t |vk )
∣∣∣∣∣ > µ2
}
+ Pr

nv∑
k=1
∣∣∣∣∣∣
n′∑
j=1
PU˜|X˜ (u˜j |˜x )4F
(n′)
V˜ n|U˜n (v˜k |u˜j )−4F
n
V˜ n|X˜n (v˜k |˜x )
∣∣∣∣∣∣ > µ2
 .
According to Lemma 5, the second item in the right side of (56) can be bound as
Pr

nv∑
k=1
∣∣∣∣∣∣
n′∑
j=1
PU˜|X˜ (u˜j |˜x )4F
(n′)
V˜ n|U˜n (v˜k |u˜j )−4F
n
V˜ n|X˜n (v˜k |˜x )
∣∣∣∣∣∣ > µ2
 <
16
µ2
n′2n2v
n
+
n2v
Pr
{(
X˜n, U˜n
)
∈ Aε
}(
PX˜ (x)− ε
)24Fmax (n′)
+ Pr{(X˜n, U˜n) /∈ Tn[X˜,U˜]
ε
}
. (57)
Then, we just need to focus on the first item in the right side of (56). Following the similar steps employed in the proof of
(5), we have
Pr
{∣∣∣∣∣FnY n|X˜n (t |˜x )−
nv∑
k=1
4Fn
V˜ n|X˜n (v˜k |˜x )FY |V (t |vk )
∣∣∣∣∣ > µ2
}
<
Pr

∣∣∣∣∣∣
nv∑
k=1
∑ni=1 1i
(
V˜i = v˜k
)
1i
(
X˜i = x˜
)
1i (Yi < t)
N (x˜ |Xn ) −
∑n
i=1 1i
(
V˜i = v˜k
)
1i
(
X˜i = x˜
)
N (x˜ |Xn ) FY |V (t |vk )
∣∣∣∣∣∣ > µ2
∣∣∣X˜n ∈ Tn[X˜]
ε
+ Pr{X˜n /∈ Tn[X˜]ε} ,
(58)
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where Pr
{
X˜n /∈ Tn[X˜]
ε
}
→ 0 as n approaches to infinity. Then, we focus on bounding the first item in the right side of (58).
Following the Chebyshev theorem, we attain
Pr

∣∣∣∣∣∣
nv∑
k=1
∑n
i=1 1i
(
V˜i = v˜k
)
1i
(
X˜i = x˜
)
1i (Yi < t)
N (x˜ |Xn ) −
∑n
i=1 1i
(
V˜i = v˜k
)
1i
(
X˜i = x˜
)
N (x˜ |Xn ) FY |V (t |vk )
∣∣∣∣∣∣ > µ2
∣∣∣X˜n ∈ Tn[X˜]
ε
 <
1
Pr
{
X˜n ∈ Tn
[X˜]
ε
} Pr

∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
nv∑
k=1
∑ni=1 1i
(
V˜i = v˜k
)
1i
(
X˜i = x˜
)
1i (Yi < t)
n
(
PX˜ (x˜)− ε
) − ∑ni=1 1i
(
V˜i = v˜k
)
1i
(
X˜i = x˜
)
n
(
PX˜ (x˜)− ε
) FY |V (t |vk )

︸ ︷︷ ︸
Hk
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
>
µ
2

≤ 4
µ2
1
Pr
{
X˜n ∈ Tn
[X˜]
ε
} nv∑
k=1
nv∑
k′=1
E (HkHk′) . (59)
E (HkHk′) =
E
(∑n
i=1 1i
(
V˜i = v˜k
)
1i
(
X˜i = x˜
) (
1i (Yi < t)− FY |V (t |vk )
))(∑n
i=1 1i
(
V˜i = v˜k
)
1i
(
X˜i = x˜
) (
1i (Yi < t)− FY |V (t |vk′ )
))
n2
(
PX˜ (x˜)− ε
)2
<
1
n
(
PX˜ (x˜)− ε
)2 +
E
(∑n
i=1
∑n
i’=1,i 6=i 1i
(
V˜i = v˜k
)
1i
(
X˜i = x˜
) (
1i (Yi < t)− FY |V (t |vk )
)
1i′
(
V˜i′ = v˜k′
)
1i
(
X˜i′ = x˜
) (
1i′ (Yi′ < t)− FY |V (t |vk )
))
n2
(
PX˜ (x˜)− ε
)2
<
5
n
(
PX˜ (x˜)− ε
)2 +
∑n−1
i=2
∑n−1
i’=2,i 6=iE
(
1i
(
V˜i = v˜k
)
1i
(
X˜i = x˜
)
1i′
(
V˜i′ = v˜k′
)
1i
(
X˜i′ = x˜
)
1i (Yi < t) 1i′ (Yi′ < t)
)
n2
(
PX˜ (x˜)− ε
)2
−
∑n−1
i=2
∑n−1
i’=2,i 6=iE
(
1i
(
V˜i = v˜k
)
1i
(
X˜i = x˜
)
1i′
(
V˜i′ = v˜k′
)
1i
(
X˜i′ = x˜
)
1i (Yi < t)FY |V (t |vk′ )
)
n2
(
PX˜ (x˜)− ε
)2
−
∑n−1
i=2
∑n−1
i’=2,i 6=iE
(
1i
(
V˜i = v˜k
)
1i
(
X˜i = x˜
)
1i′
(
V˜i′ = v˜k′
)
1i
(
X˜i′ = x˜
)
FY |V (t |vk ) 1i′ (Yi′ < t)
)
n2
(
PX˜ (x˜)− ε
)2
+
∑n−1
i=2
∑n−1
i’=2,i 6=iE
(
1i
(
V˜i = v˜k
)
1i
(
X˜i = x˜
)
1i′
(
V˜i′ = v˜k′
)
1i
(
X˜i′ = x˜
)
FY |V (t |vk )FY |V (t |vk′ )
)
n2
(
PX˜ (x˜)− ε
)2
<
5
n
(
PX˜ (x˜)− ε
)2 +
∑n−1
i=2
∑n−1
i’=2,i 6=i PV˜i,V˜i′ ,X1,i,X1,i′ (v˜k, v˜k
′ , x˜, x˜)4Gmax
n2
(
PX˜ (x˜)− ε
)2
<
5
n
(
PX˜ (x˜)− ε
)2 + PV˜i,V˜i′ ,X1,i,X1,i′ (v˜k, v˜k′ , x˜, x˜)4Gmax(
PX˜ (x˜)− ε
)2 (60)
Substituting (60) into (59), we get
Pr

∣∣∣∣∣∣
nv∑
k=1
∑n
i=1 1i
(
V˜i = v˜k
)
1i
(
X˜i = x˜
)
1i (Yi < t)
N (x˜ |Xn ) −
∑n
i=1 1i
(
V˜i = v˜k
)
1i
(
X˜i = x˜
)
N (x˜ |Xn ) FY |V (t |vk )
∣∣∣∣∣∣ > µ2
∣∣∣X˜n ∈ Tn[X˜]
ε

<
4
µ2
1
Pr
{
X˜n ∈ Tn
[X˜]
ε
} ( 5n2v
n
(
PX˜ (x˜)− ε
)2 + 4Gmax(
PX˜ (x˜)− ε
)2
)
(61)
From (61), (56), (57), and (58), we finally obtain
Pr

∣∣∣∣∣∣FnY n|X˜n (t |˜x )−
nv∑
k=1
n′∑
j=1
PU˜|X˜ (u˜j |˜x )4F
(n′)
V˜ n|U˜n (v˜k |u˜j )FY |V (t |vk )
∣∣∣∣∣∣ > µ

<
4
µ2
1
Pr
{
X˜n ∈ Tn
[X˜]
ε
} ( 5n2v
n
(
PX˜ (x˜)− ε
)2 + 4Gmax(
PX˜ (x˜)− ε
)2
)
+ Pr
{
X˜n /∈ Tn[X˜]
ε
}
+
16
µ2
n′2n2v
n
+
n2v
Pr
{(
X˜n, U˜n
)
∈ Aε
}(
PX˜ (x)− ε
)24Fmax (n′)
+ Pr{(X˜n, U˜n) /∈ Tn[X˜,U˜]
ε
}
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The proof is finished.
Upon the convergence property, the following lemma is immediate.
Lemma 7. For sequence t1, t2, . . . , tny−1, upon setup that β3 = −α3 = √ny , n2y =
√
nv , and n2v =
√
n′, we have
1) Fix µ to arbitrary small value, there has
lim
n→∞,n′→∞
Pr
β3 − α3ny − 2 β4 − α4nx − 2
nx−1∑
i=1
ny−1∑
m=1
∣∣∣∣∣∣FnY n|X˜n (tm |˜xi )−
nv∑
k=1
n′∑
j=1
PU˜|X˜ (u˜j |˜xi )4F
(n′)
V˜ n|U˜n (v˜k |u˜j )FY |V (tm |vk )
∣∣∣∣∣∣ > µ
 = 0.
(62)
2) Fix n′ to arbitrary large value, and  to arbitrary small value, there has
Pr
β3 − α3ny − 2 β4 − α4nx − 2
nx−1∑
i=1
ny−1∑
m=1
∣∣∣∣∣∣FnY n|X˜n (tm |˜xi )−
nv∑
k=1
n′∑
j=1
PU˜|X˜ (u˜j |˜xi )4F
(n′)
V˜ n|U˜n (v˜k |u˜j )FY |V (tm |vk )
∣∣∣∣∣∣ > µn′
 ≤ 
(63)
where n approaches to infinity, limn′→∞ µn′ = 0.
Proof: For arbitrary small µ, we have
Pr
β3 − α3ny − 2 β4 − α4nx − 2
nx−1∑
i=1
ny−1∑
m=1
∣∣∣∣∣∣FnY n|X˜n (tm |˜xi )−
nv∑
k=1
n′∑
j=1
PU˜|X˜ (u˜j |˜xi )4F
(n′)
V˜ n|U˜n (v˜k |u˜j )FY |V (tm |vk )
∣∣∣∣∣∣ > µ
 (64)
≤
nx−1∑
i=1
ny−1∑
m=1
Pr

∣∣∣∣∣∣FnY n|X˜n (tm |˜xi )−
nv∑
k=1
n′∑
j=1
PU˜|X˜ (u˜j |˜xi )4F
(n′)
V˜ n|U˜n (v˜k |u˜j )FY |V (t |vk )
∣∣∣∣∣∣ > µ(ny − 2)(nx − 2)(β3 − α3)(β4 − α4)(ny − 1)(nx − 1)

<
4(ny − 1)2(nx − 1)2
µ2(ny − 2)2(nx − 2)2
1
Pr
{
X˜n ∈ Tn
[X˜]
ε
} (5n2v(β3 − α3)2(β4 − α4)2nynx
n
(
PX˜ (x˜)− ε
)2 + nynx(β3 − α3)2(β4 − α4)24Gmax(
PX˜ (x˜)− ε
)2
)
+ nxny Pr
{
X˜n /∈ Tn[X˜]
ε
}
+
16(ny − 1)2(nx − 1)2
µ2(ny − 2)2(nx − 2)2
n′2n2v(β3 − α3)2(β4 − α4)2nxny
n
+
n2v(β3 − α3)2(β4 − α4)2nxny
Pr
{(
X˜n, U˜n
)
∈ Aε
}(
PX˜ (x)− ε
)24Fmax (n′)
+ nxny Pr{(X˜n, U˜n) /∈ Tn[X˜,U˜]
ε
}
where the last inequality follows Lemma 6. Upon the setup that β3 = −α3 = √ny , n2y =
√
nv , and n2v =
√
n′, we have
n2v(β3 − α3)2(β4 − α4)2nxny < n′1/2,
Then, n2v(β3 − α3)2(β4 − α4)2nxny4Fmax (n′)→ 0 as n′ →∞ according to Lemma 3, and
nynx(β3 − α3)2(β4 − α4)2 < nv1/2
nynx(β3 − α3)2(β4 − α4)24Gmax → 0 as n′ → ∞ according to Lemma 4. With these results, the upper bound of (64)
approaches to 0, as n′ →∞, n→∞. Hence, the first assertion is proved. Furthermore, again relying on (64), let us set
 =
4(ny − 1)2(nx − 1)2
µ2n′(ny − 2)2(nx − 2)2
1
Pr
{
X˜n ∈ Tn
[X˜]
ε
} (5n2v(β3 − α3)2(β4 − α4)2nynx
n
(
PX˜ (x˜)− ε
)2 + nynx(β3 − α3)2(β4 − α4)24Gmax(
PX˜ (x˜)− ε
)2
)
+ nxny Pr
{
X˜n /∈ Tn[X˜]
ε
}
+
16(ny − 1)2(nx − 1)2
µ2n′(ny − 2)2(nx − 2)2
n′2n2v(β3 − α3)2(β4 − α4)2nxny
n
+
n2v(β3 − α3)2(β4 − α4)2nxny
Pr
{(
X˜n, U˜n
)
∈ Aε
}(
PX˜ (x)− ε
)24Fmax (n′)
+ nxny Pr{(X˜n, U˜n) /∈ Tn[X˜,U˜]
ε
}
As  is fixed, and n approaches to infinity, it is readily available to get limn′→∞ µn′ = 0. The second statement can be proved.
26
B. Sufficiency Proof
Let us go back to the proof of theorem 1. With the aforementioned lemmas, we will show the decision statistic Dn =
1
nx−2
1
ny−2
∑nx−1
k=1
∑ny−1
m=1
∣∣∣Fn
Y n|X˜n (tm |˜xk )−
∫ +∞
−∞ fU|X˜ (u |˜xk )FY |V (tm |u ) du
∣∣∣ simultaneously satisfies the properties stated by
Theorem 1.
Upon n′, we define function
M(n
′)
(
W (n
′)
)
=
β4 − α4
nx − 2
β3 − α3
ny − 2
nx−1∑
k=1
ny−1∑
m=1
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∫ +∞
−∞
fU|X˜ (u |˜xk )FY |V (tm |u ) du−
nv∑
j=1
n′∑
i=1
PU˜|X˜ (u˜i)wi,j,kFY |V (tm |vm,j,k )
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
where W (n
′) is a matrix variable
[
W (n
′)
]
i,j,k
= wi,j,k, i = 1, 2, . . . , n′, j = 1, 2, . . . , nv , k = 1, 2, . . . , nx and
FY |V (tm |vm,j,k ) =
∫
u∈B(˜vj) fU|X˜ (u |˜xk )FY |V (tm |u ) du∫
u∈B(˜vj) fU|X˜ (u |˜xk ) du
. (65)
According to the definition of PU˜|X˜ (u˜i) and FY |V (tm |vm,j,k ) =
∫
u∈B(v˜j) fU|X˜ (u|˜xk )FY |V (tm|u )du∫
u∈B(v˜j) fU|X˜ (u|˜xk )du
, M(n
′)
(
W (n
′)
)
= 0 has
one solution in the point that W (
n′)
0 defined as
[
W
(n′)
0
]
i,j,k
=

1, B (u˜i) ⊆ B (v˜j)
0, otherwise
i = 1, . . . n′, j = 1, . . . n′ − 1, k = 1, 2, . . . , nx in the domain D(n′) =
{
W (n
′) : 0 ≤ wi,j,k ≤ 1,
∑nv
j=1 wi,j,k = 1, j =
1, 2, . . . nv, i = 1, . . . n
′, k = 1, 2, . . . , nx
}
. We also define D(n′)s as D(n′)s = {W (n′) : ∣∣∣W (n′) −W (n′)0 ∣∣∣ ≥ δ, W (n′) ∈ D(n′)},
and the infimum of M(n
′)
(
W (n
′)
)
over D(n
′)
s is denoted as λ(n
′) (δ).
Lemma 8. If λ(n
′) (δ) is strictly positive, then M(n
′)
(
W (n
′)
)
= 0 has single solution in the point W (
n′)
0 . Moreover,
λ(n
′) (δ)→ 0, δ → 0.
Proof: Using the observation that M(n
′)
(
W (n
′)
)
is a convex function, the proof of this lemma follows our previous
work.
Lemma 9. If the wireless channel is non-manipulable, then for arbitrary small δ, there exist sufficient large n0, such that for
any n′ > n0, λ(n
′) (δ) ≥ µn′ .
Proof: Notice that for arbitrary W (n
′)
f ∈ D(n
′), there exist a pdf function f (t |u ) which satisfies[
W
(n′)
f
]
i,j,k
=
∫
u∈B(u˜i)
∫
v∈B(v˜j) f (v |u ) fU|X˜ (u |˜xk ) dudv∫
u∈B(u˜i) fU|X˜ (u |˜xk ) du
. (66)
Then, according to the condition that
4n′
k
4n′
k−1
= k and
4n′
k
4n′1
= sk, fixing f (t |u ),
∣∣∣W (n′)f −W (n′)0 ∣∣∣ ≥ δ implies ∣∣∣W (n′k)f −W (n′k)0 ∣∣∣ ≥
δ for n′k > n
′. For the sake of proof, we define a function set
F =
f (v |u ) : limn′→∞
nx∑
k=1
nv∑
j=1
n′∑
i=1
∣∣∣∣∣
∫
u∈B(u˜i)
∫
v∈B(v˜j) f (v |u ) fU|X˜ (u |˜xk ) dudv∫
u∈B(u˜i) fU|X˜ (u |˜xk ) du
−
[
W
(n′)
0
]
i.j,k
∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ δ
 . (67)
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Then, we define D˜(n′)s as
D˜(n′)s =
{
W (n
′) :
[
W (n
′)
]
i,j,k
=
∫
u∈B(u˜i)
∫
v∈B(v˜j) f (v |u ) fU|X˜ (u |˜xk ) dudv∫
u∈B(u˜i) fU|X˜ (u |˜xk ) du
, f (v |u ) ∈ F
}
(68)
Obviously, D(n′)s ⊆ D˜(n
′)
s , hence, we get λ(n
′) (δ) ≥ λ˜(n′) (δ) where λ˜(n′) (δ) is infimum of M(n′)
(
W (n
′)
)
across D˜(n′)s .
For arbitrary f (v |u ) ∈ F , we define v̂(n′)m,j,k which satisfies
FY |V
(
tm
∣∣∣v̂(n′)m,j,k ) =
∫
u∈B(u˜i)
∫
v∈B(v˜j) f (v |u ) fU|X˜ (u |˜xk )FY |V (tm |v ) dudv∫
u∈B(u˜i)
∫
v∈B(v˜j) f (v |u ) fU|X˜ (u |˜xk ) dudv
. (69)
Then, we have
−
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∫ +∞
−∞
fU|X˜ (u |˜xk )FY |V (tm |u ) du−
nv∑
j=1
n′∑
i=1
PU˜|X˜ (u˜i)wi,j,kFY |V (tm |vm,j,k )
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
+
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∫ +∞
−∞
fU|X˜ (u |˜xk )FY |V (tm |u ) du−
nv∑
j=1
n′∑
i=1
PU˜|X˜ (u˜i)wi,j,kFY |V
(
tm
∣∣∣v̂(n′)m,j,k )
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
=
2 ∫ +∞
−∞
fU|X˜ (u |˜xk )FY |V (tm |u ) du−
nv∑
j=1
n′∑
i=1
PU˜|X˜ (u˜i)wi,j,kFY |V (tm |vm,j,k )−
nv∑
j=1
n′∑
i=1
PU˜|X˜ (u˜i)wi,j,kFY |V
(
tm
∣∣∣v̂(n′)m,j,k )

 nv∑
j=1
n′∑
i=1
PU˜|X˜ (u˜i)wi,j,kFY |V (tm |vm,j,k )−
nv∑
j=1
n′∑
i=1
PU˜|X˜ (u˜i)wi,j,kFY |V
(
tm
∣∣∣v̂(n′)m,j,k )

< 2 max
j=1,2,...,nv,m=1,...,ny
∣∣∣∣∣ maxv∈B(v˜j)FY |V (tm |v )− minv∈B(v˜j)FY |V (tm |v )
∣∣∣∣∣
Then, we get ∣∣∣∣∣∣
∫ +∞
−∞
fU|X˜ (u |˜xk )FY |V (tm |u ) du−
nv∑
j=1
n′∑
i=1
PU˜|X˜ (u˜i)wi,j,kFY |V
(
tm
∣∣∣v̂(n′)m,j,k )
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
− 2 max
j=1,2,...,nv,m=1,...,ny
∣∣∣∣∣ maxv∈B(v˜j)FY |V (tm |v )− minv∈B(v˜j)FY |V (tm |v )
∣∣∣∣∣
<
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∫ +∞
−∞
fU|X˜ (u |˜xk )FY |V (tm |v ) du−
nv∑
j=1
n′∑
i=1
PU˜|X˜ (u˜i)wi,j,kFY |V (tm |vm,j,k )
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
(70)
From (70), we have
M̂(n
′)
(
W
(n′)
f
)
≤M(n′)
(
W
(n′)
f
)
+ γn′ (71)
where
M(n
′)
(
W (n
′)
)
=
β4 − α4
nx − 2
β3 − α3
ny − 2
nx−1∑
k=1
ny−1∑
m=1
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∫ +∞
−∞
fU|X˜ (u |˜xk )FY |V (tm |u ) du−
nv∑
j=1
n′∑
i=1
PU˜|X˜ (u˜i)wi,j,kFY |V
(
tm
∣∣∣v̂(n′)m,j,k )
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
γn′ = max
j=1,...,nv,m=1,...,ny
4
√
ny
√
nx
∣∣∣∣∣ maxv∈B(v˜j)FY |V (tm |v )− minv∈B(v˜m,j)FY |V (tm |v )
∣∣∣∣∣ (72)
According to the stochastic property of channel model, we have limn′→∞ γn′ = 0. In order to prove M̂(n
′)
(
W
(n′)
f
)
−γn′ >
µn′ , for arbitrary f (v |u ) ∈ F , we assume for arbitrary large n′0, there exist n′ > n′0, such that λ̂(n
′) (δ)− γn′ ≤ µn′ . In other
words, there exist a sequence denoted as n̂1 < n̂2 < . . . ,∞ by which
M̂ (n̂k)
(
W
(n̂k)
f
)
− γn̂k ≤ µn̂k . (73)
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Then, we have
lim
k→∞
M̂ (n̂k)
(
W
(n̂k)
f
)
≤ lim
k→∞
(µn̂k + γn̂k) = 0 (74)
From the expressions of W (n
′)
f and M̂
(n′)
(
W (n
′)
)
, we get there is a division manner for t ∈ (−∞,+∞) characterized by
n̂1 < n̂2 < . . . ,∞ such that
lim
n̂k→∞
β4 − α4
nx − 2
β3 − α3
ny − 2
nx−1∑
k=1
ny−2∑
m=1
∣∣∣∣∫ +∞−∞ fU|X˜ (u |˜xk )FY |V
(
t(n̂k)m |u
)
du−
∫ +∞
−∞
∫ +∞
−∞
fU|X˜ (u |˜xk ) f (v |u )FY |V
(
t(n̂k)m |v
)
dudv
∣∣∣∣2 = 0 (75)
On the other hand, from the definition of F and the condition that the wireless channel is non-manipulable, we get∫ +∞
−∞
fU |X (u |x )FY |V (t |u ) du 6=
∫ +∞
−∞
∫ +∞
−∞
fU |X (u |x ) f (v |u )FY |V (t |u ) dvdu (76)
Hence, if
∫ +∞
−∞
∫ +∞
−∞
∣∣∣∫ +∞−∞ fU |X (u |x )FY |V (t |u ) du− ∫ +∞−∞ ∫ +∞−∞ fU |X (u |x ) f (v |u )FY |V (t |u ) dvdu∣∣∣2 dxdt can be inte-
grated, we must have∫ +∞
−∞
∫ +∞
−∞
∣∣∣∣∫ +∞−∞ fU |X (u |x )FY |V (t |u ) du−
∫ +∞
−∞
∫ +∞
−∞
fU |X (u |x ) f (v |u )FY |V (t |u ) dvdu
∣∣∣∣2 dxdt > 0, (77)
which indicates there is no division manner for t ∈ (−∞,+∞) making (75) be true. It contradicts with the meaning of (75). We
proceed to examine another case that if
∫ +∞
−∞
∫ +∞
−∞
∣∣∣∫ +∞−∞ fU|X (u |x )FY |V (t |u ) du− ∫ +∞−∞ ∫ +∞−∞ fU|X (u |x ) f (v |u )FY |V (t |u ) dvdu∣∣∣2 dxdt
cannot be integrated, since
∣∣∣∫ +∞−∞ fU|X (u |x )FY |V (t |u ) du− ∫ +∞−∞ ∫ +∞−∞ fU|X (u |x ) f (v |u )FY |V (t |u ) dvdu∣∣∣2 > 0, we have
lim
β˜→∞,α˜→−∞
lim
β→∞,α→−∞
∫ β˜
α˜
∫ β
α
∣∣∣∣∫ +∞−∞ fU|X (u |x )FY |V (t |u ) du−
∫ +∞
−∞
∫ +∞
−∞
fU|X (u |x ) f (v |u )FY |V (t |u ) dvdu
∣∣∣∣2 dtdx =∞
(78)
Hence, there has α′, β′, α˜′ and β˜′ by which∫ β˜′
α˜′
∫ β′
α′
∣∣∣∣∫ +∞−∞ fU |X (u |x )FY |V (t |u ) du−
∫ +∞
−∞
∫ +∞
−∞
fU |X (u |x ) f (v |u )FY |V (t |u ) dvdu
∣∣∣∣2 dtdx > 0 (79)
Meanwhile, (75) indicates
lim
n̂k→∞
β4 − α4
nx − 2
β3 − α3
ny − 2
∑
x˜k∈[α˜′,β˜′]
∑
tm∈[α′,β′]∣∣∣∣∫ +∞−∞ fU|X˜ (u |˜xk )FY |V
(
t(n̂k)m |u
)
du−
∫ +∞
−∞
∫ +∞
−∞
fU|X˜ (u |˜xk ) f (v |u )FY |V
(
t(n̂k)m |v
)
dudv
∣∣∣∣2 = 0. (80)
However, (79) indicates there is no division manner for t ∈ (α′, β′) and x2 ∈
(
α̂′, β̂′
)
making (80) be true. Hence, the
contradiction happens. Due to these contradictions, we attain the assumption that for arbitrary large n′0, there exist n
′ >
n′0, such that M̂(
n′)
(
W
(n′)
f
)
− γn′ ≤ µn′ is not right. Therefore, we have there exist n′0, for any n′ > n′0, there has
M̂(n
′)
(
W
(n′)
f
)
− γn′ > µn′ . Applying the aforementioned derivation to each function belonging to F , we get there exist
n0, for any n′ > n0, M̂(n
′)
(
W
(n′)
f
)
− γn′ > µn′ is available for all possible functions of F . According to (71), we have
M(n
′)
(
W
(n′)
f
)
< µn′ (81)
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for each function belonging to F . Since λ˜(n′) (δ) is infimum of M(n′)
(
W (n
′)
)
across D˜(n′)s , we thus have
λ˜(n
′) (δ) > µn′ (82)
Revisiting λ(n
′) (δ) ≥ λ˜(n′) (δ), we get
λ(n
′) (δ) > µn′ (83)
Finally, the proof is completed.
Lemma 10. Fixing arbitrary small  and δ, if there exist n′0 such that
Pr{
nv∑
j=1
n′0∑
i=1
∣∣∣∣4F (n′0)V˜ n|U˜n (v˜j |u˜i )−W (n′0)0
∣∣∣∣︸ ︷︷ ︸
R(Un,V n,n′0)
> δ} > 0
then, we have for n′ > n′0, Pr {Dn < ε (n′, δ) |R (Un, V n, n′) > δ } is well-defined and
Pr {Dn < ε (n′, δ) |R (Un, V n, n′) > δ } ≤ 
where n→∞, n′ is sufficient large so as to satisfy the properties given by lemma 4 and lemma 6. ε (n′, δ) is strictly positive
and can be arbitrary small value.
Proof: According to lemma 7, there exist µn′ such that
Pr
β4 − α4nx − 2 β3 − α3ny − 2
nx−1∑
k=1
ny−1∑
m=1
∣∣∣∣∣∣FnY n|X˜n (t |˜xk )−
nv∑
j=1
n′∑
i=1
PU˜|X˜ (u˜i |˜x )4F
(n′)
V˜ n|U˜n (v˜j |u˜i )FY |V (tm |vm,j,k )
∣∣∣∣∣∣ > µn′

≤ Pr{R (Un, V n, n′0) > δ} ≤ Pr{R (Un, V n, n′) > δ} , (84)
where µn′ → 0 as n′ →∞, n→∞. The last inequality follows the fact that R (Un, V n, n′0) > δ implies R (Un, V n, n′) > δ
according to the definition of 4F (n′)
V˜ n|U˜n (v˜j |u˜i ).
Then, if
β
(n′)
4 − α(n
′)
4
nx − 2
β
(n′)
3 − α(n
′)
3
ny − 2
nx−1∑
k=1
ny−1∑
m=1
∣∣∣∣∣∣FnY n|X˜n (t |˜xk )−
nv∑
j=1
n′∑
i=1
PU˜|X˜ (u˜i |˜x )4F
(n′)
V˜ n|U˜n (v˜j |u˜i )FY |V (tm |vm,j,k )
∣∣∣∣∣∣︸ ︷︷ ︸
G(V n,Un,X˜n)
< µn′ ,
we must have(
β
(n′)
3 − α(n
′)
3
)(
β
(n′)
4 − α(n
′)
4
)
Dn
≥ β
(n̂k)
4 − α(n̂k)4
nx − 2
β
(n̂k)
3 − α(n̂k)3
ny − 2
nx−1∑
k=1
ny−1∑
m=1
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∫ +∞
−∞
fU|X˜ (u |˜xk )FY |V (tm |u ) du−
nv∑
j=1
n′∑
i=1
PU˜|X˜ (u˜i |˜x )4F
(n′)
V˜ n|U˜n (v˜j |u˜i )FY |V (tm |vm,j,k )
∣∣∣∣∣∣− µn′
(85)
≥ β
(n′)
4 − α(n
′)
4
nx − 2
β
(n′)
3 − α(n
′)
3
ny − 2
nx−1∑
k=1
ny−1∑
m=1
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∫ +∞
−∞
fU|X˜ (u |˜xk )FY |V (tm |u ) du−
nv∑
j=1
n′∑
i=1
PU˜|X˜ (u˜i |˜x )4F
(n′)
V˜ n|U˜n (v˜j |u˜i )FY |V (tm |vm,j,k )
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
− µn′
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On the other hand, if
nv∑
j=1
n′∑
i=1
∣∣∣∣4F (n′)V˜ n|U˜n (v˜j |u˜i )−W (n′)0
∣∣∣∣︸ ︷︷ ︸
R(Un,V n,n′)
> δ, according to lemma 8, the right side of (85) becomes
(
β
(n′)
3 − α(n
′)
3
)(
β
(n′)
4 − α(n
′)
4
)
Dn ≥ λ(n′) (δ)− µn′ (86)
which can be reshaped as
Dn ≥ λ
(n′) (δ)− µn′(
β
(n′)
3 − α(n
′)
3
)(
β
(n′)
4 − α(n
′)
4
) (87)
Define ε (n′, δ) = λ
(n′)(δ)−µn′(
β
(n′)
3 −α(n
′)
3
)(
β
(n′)
4 −α(n
′)
4
) , according to lemma 9, ε (n′, δ) > 0 as n′ is sufficient large. From the properties
of µn′ and λ(n
′) (δ), ε (n′, δ) can be arbitrarily small.
Upon (85), (86) and (87), we have
Pr
{
Dn ≥ ε (n′, δ) , R (Un, V n, n′) ≥ δ}
≥ Pr
{
Dn ≥ ε (n′, δ) , R (Un, V n, n′) ≥ δ,G(V n, Un, X˜n) ≤ µ′}
= Pr
{
R
(
Un, V n, n′
) ≥ δ,G(V n, Un, X˜n) ≤ µn′}
≥ Pr{R (Un, V n, n′) ≥ δ}− Pr{G(V n, Un, X˜n) ≥ µn′}
where the equation follows the logic from (85), (86) to (87). Then, we have
Pr
{
Dn ≥ ε (n′, δ) ∣∣R (Un, V n, n′) ≥ δ} = Pr {Dn ≥ ε (n′, δ) , R (Un, V n, n′) ≥ δ}
Pr {R (Un, V n, n′) ≥ δ} > 1−
Pr
{
G
(
V n, Un, X˜n
)
≥ µn′
}
Pr {R (Un, V n, n′) ≥ δ} ≥ 1− 
(88)
where the last inequality follows (84). The proof is finished.
The first property of theorem 1 is direct result from lemma 10.
We proceed to prove the second property of theorem 1. For arbitrary small δ, µ and µ′(n′, δ) = µ+ nx−1nx−2
ny−1
ny−2δ, we have
Pr
Dn ≤ µ′(n′, δ)⋂
nv∑
j=1
n′∑
i=1
∣∣∣∣4F (n′)V˜ n|U˜n (v˜j |u˜i )−W (n′)0
∣∣∣∣ ≤ δ
 ≥
Pr
{
Dn ≤ µ′(n′, δ)
⋂ 1
nx − 2
1
ny − 2
nx−1∑
k=1
ny−1∑
m=1
∣∣∣∣∣∣FnY n|X˜n (t |˜xk )−
nv∑
j=1
n′∑
i=1
PU˜|X˜ (u˜i |˜x )4F
(n′)
V˜ n|U˜n (v˜j |u˜i )FY |V (tm |vm,j,k )
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ µ
⋂ nv∑
j=1
n′∑
i=1
∣∣∣∣4F (n′)V˜ n|U˜n (v˜j |u˜i )−W (n′)0
∣∣∣∣ ≤ δ}
= Pr
{ 1
nx − 2
1
ny − 2
nx−1∑
k=1
ny−1∑
m=1
∣∣∣∣∣∣FnY n|X˜n (t |˜xk )−
nv∑
j=1
n′∑
i=1
PU˜|X˜ (u˜i |˜x )4F
(n′)
V˜ n|U˜n (v˜j |u˜i )FY |V (tm |vm,j,k )
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ µ
⋂ nv∑
j=1
n′∑
i=1
∣∣∣∣4F (n′)V˜ n|U˜n (v˜j |u˜i )−W (n′)0
∣∣∣∣ ≤ δ}
≥ Pr

nv∑
j=1
n′∑
i=1
∣∣∣∣4F (n′)V˜ n|U˜n (v˜j |u˜i )−W (n′)0
∣∣∣∣ ≤ δ
−
Pr
 1nx − 2 1ny − 2
nx−1∑
k=1
ny−1∑
m=1
∣∣∣∣∣∣FnY n|X˜n (t |˜xk )−
nv∑
j=1
n′∑
i=1
PU˜|X˜ (u˜i |˜x )4F
(n′)
V˜ n|U˜n (v˜j |u˜i )FY |V (tm |vm,j,k )
∣∣∣∣∣∣ > µ

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where the equality firstly follows the fact that
Dn ≤ 1
nx − 2
1
ny − 2
nx−1∑
k=1
ny−1∑
m=1
∣∣∣∣∣∣FnY n|X˜n (t |˜xk )−
nv∑
j=1
n′∑
i=1
PU˜|X˜ (u˜i |˜x )4F
(n′)
V˜ n|U˜n (v˜j |u˜i )FY |V (tm |vm,j,k )
∣∣∣∣∣∣
+
1
nx − 2
1
ny − 2
nx−1∑
k=1
ny−1∑
m=1
∣∣∣∣∣∣
nv∑
j=1
n′∑
i=1
PU˜|X˜ (u˜i |˜xk )
(
4F (n′)
V˜ n|U˜n (v˜j |u˜i )−
[
W
(n′)
0
]
i,j
)
FY |V (tm |vm,j,k )
∣∣∣∣∣∣
< µ+
nx − 1
nx − 2
ny − 1
ny − 2δ = µ
′(n′, δ). (89)
Hence, the equality in (89) is established. Upon (89) and lemma 3, the property 2 in Theorem 1 is direct.
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